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Wealth transfers between parents and children
can be examined using intergenerational
transfer models. These models can indicate
both motivation for transfers as well as the
allocation of transferred wealth among
recipients.
Two primary motivations for wealth transfers
are noted:
1. Altruism suggests that a parent derives
utility from both consumption and the
utility of his child and will make transfers to
the child in order to increase the child’s
utility thereby increasing the parent’s utility
(Barro 1974; Becker 1974).
2. Exchange motivation suggests that a parent
will make transfers to the child in exchange
for some type of services provided by the
child to the parent (Bernheim, Shleifer, and
Summers 1985).
Family farm businesses are much more likely to
be passed on from one generation to the next
than other types of family businesses (Keating
and Munro 1989; Laband and Lentz 1983).
These transfers can be interpreted as a
specialized type of wealth transfer between
parents and children.
Objectives
1. Introduce an intergenerational transfer
model which incorporates both altruism
and exchange motivation in the family farm
business transfer decision making process.
2. Provide evidence from simulated
intergenerational transfer decisions as to
whether family farm business operators are
altruistically or exchange motivated when
transferring the family farm business.
Methods
The model used is adapted from Cox and Rank (1992). It allows for
assessment of both altruistic and exchange motives and assumes two
individuals, a parent and a child. The parent’s objective function is:
Up = U(Cp, s, V(Ck, s))
subject to the following constraints:
Cp = Ip – T
Ck = Ik + T
where Upis parent utility, V is child utility, Cp is parent consumption, Ck is
child consumption, s is services the child provides to the parent, Ip is the
parent’s net worth, Ik is the child’s pre-transfer income, and T is the
transfer amount. In the case of farm families, services are considered to
be help or work that the child performs within the family farm business.
Both the transfer decision as well as the transfer amount can be
modeled.
Transfer Decision (estimated using a Probit analysis):
ti = b0 + b1 Child Age + b2 Child Earnings + b3 One Sibling +
b4 Two Siblings + b5 Three Or More Siblings + b6 Parent Age +
b7 Parent Education-High School + b8 Parent Education-Some College +
b9 Parent Education-College + b10 Parent Net Worth +
b11 Parent Works Off Farm + b12 Parent Will Retire within 5 years +
b13 Child Helps On Farm + ei.
Transfer Amount (estimated using a Tobit analysis):
Ti > 0 iff ti > 0, Ti = 0 otherwise
Ti = b0 + b1 Child Age + b2 Child Earnings + b3 One Sibling +
b4 Two Siblings + b5 Three Or More Siblings + b6 Parent Age +
b7 Parent Education-High School + b8 Parent Education-Some College +
b9 Parent Education-College + b10 Parent Net Worth +
b11 Parent Works Off Farm + b12 Parent Will Retire within 5 years +
b13 Child Helps On Farm + mi.
3000 observations were simulated to model the transfer decision.
660 observations indicated that a transfer of some amount occurred.
Results
Altruism predicts that the coefficient for child earnings will
be negative for both the transfer decision as well as the
transfer amount. Parent age and the parent achieving a
college education were significant indicators of the transfer
decision. Child age, child earnings, number of siblings,
parent education, and parent net worth were significant
indicators of the transfer amount.
Conclusions
Results indicate that motivation for
transfers of family farm businesses from
parents to children is altruistic. This
conclusion suggests that in families with
multiple children, transfers of the
business will be allocated proportionally
among children in order to equalize
utility all of children.
Future research will include conducting
surveys of farm families to further
examine factors which motivate farm
families to transfer farm businesses to
members of the next generation.
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Asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Wald C2 = 137.28 (p <.0001)